> > New US attacks on Iran? Wechsler (Atlantic Council): "Trump doesn't want to...

New US attacks on Iran? Wechsler (Atlantic Council): "Trump doesn't want to go down in history as a loser."

New US attacks on Iran? Wechsler (Atlantic Council): "Trump doesn't want to go down in history as a loser."

(Adnkronos) - Donald Trump may decide to renew his military attack on Iran to prevent the war, unpopular in the United States and which cost the Republicans a heavy defeat in the midterm elections, from turning into the political failure destined to mark his presidency.

(Adnkronos) – Donald Trump may decide to renew his military attack on Iran to prevent the war, unpopular in the United States and which cost the Republicans a heavy defeat in the midterm elections, from turning into the political failure destined to define his presidency. This is the scenario outlined by William F. Wechsler, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, and a former senior Pentagon official, in an interview with Adnkronos on the sidelines of the MED Dialogues, taking place in Naples from November 19 to 21. 

According to Wechsler, the Democratic victory in Congress will not necessarily reduce the American president's freedom of action.

On the contrary, it could push him to focus on foreign policy, where he wields much broader powers. Meanwhile, Iran, despite being weakened militarily and economically, has succeeded in shifting the security balance in the Gulf, forcing Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, and Oman to develop increasingly divergent strategies. 

The midterm elections produced a clear Democratic victory.

What consequences will this have on American policy in the Middle East and, above all, towards Iran?
 

The midterm elections were a true blue wave. Trump and the Republicans lost far more than they expected, and far more than is usually the case in midterm elections. On election day, the president announced he would eliminate US funding for military assistance to Israel starting at the end of the year.

It probably won't happen, but it's significant that I felt the need to announce it on that day. 

The next day, the vice president published a lengthy analysis of the reasons for the defeat. At least two of the four reasons cited, and likely three, involved Israel and the Middle East. It's clear that the administration believes the region played a disproportionate role in the election. 

Some observers abroad believe that, with the arrival of the Democrats, Trump will be more constrained in his Middle East policy. In reality, the opposite is true. In the immediate future, he has been forced to pause to restore order within his administration, find consensus within the White House, and engage with the Republican Party. But this phase is now coming to an end. 

Congressional Democrats will have all the tools they need to thwart Trump's domestic agenda. They may make a lot of noise about his foreign policy, but they will have a much more limited ability to stop it. In our system, the president is the commander in chief, and the legislation grants him very broad powers to use military force. Trump has already demonstrated his willingness to exercise them. 

Over the next two years, he doesn't want to limit himself to vetoing congressional initiatives. He's made this public. He'll focus on where he retains his power: foreign policy. 

And today he faces the possibility of his worst nightmare coming true: going down in history as a loser, for a policy he himself decided to adopt. It's not about Covid, which arrived unexpectedly. It was his decision to go to war with Iran, and so far that war has not gone well and is facing strong opposition in the United States. 

Trump would like a deal in which Iran capitulates to his demands, especially on its nuclear program. But anyone familiar with Iran knows how unlikely this is. It's more likely that Tehran believes it has achieved a political victory against Donald Trump, as it once did against Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush. And that it will continue to push in this direction, increasing the pressure. 

At that point, Trump might conclude that the only way to avoid going down in history as a loser is to win the war. If this is his reasoning, we can imagine a new escalation even relatively quickly. 

As we speak, a third carrier battle group has been moved into the CENTCOM area of ​​responsibility. This is a huge concentration of naval assets. We haven't seen a deployment of this scale in the region since the eve of the Iraq war in 2003. The United States normally has three or four carrier battle groups that can deploy simultaneously around the world, and today virtually all of these assets are concentrated there. Deployments like this end up generating their own dynamic. We'll see. 

You've recently been to the Middle East and the Gulf countries. How are regional balances changing? Is Iran stronger today than it was a year ago? And how are the Gulf monarchies reacting?
 

At the beginning of the year, Iran was in a position of considerable weakness. I give Trump credit for deciding to use force against Iran's nuclear program last year. That was a good use of military force. 

Unfortunately, while the US military has inflicted massive damage on Iran and the naval blockade continues to severely damage its economy, Tehran has demonstrated that it can project its power and strike at its Gulf neighbors at will. 

It has established a new normal, in which it can attack while remaining below the threshold that would trigger a full-scale war. It can strike any of its neighbors, at any time, or even maritime traffic. In the past, this would have been considered a casus belli, something the United States would have gone to war over. Today, it happens, and it doesn't lead to war. From Tehran's perspective, this is an advantage. 

Let's not forget that Iran's decision-makers have only one goal: to stay in power. Not the well-being of the Iranian people. They are willing to accept enormous damage just to survive politically. 

There is one thing we should eliminate from our vocabulary: speaking of the Gulf as a unitary entity. The Gulf is not a political entity. It is a collection of distinct states. We are entering an era in which each of these states acts with its own strategic autonomy, identifying different national interests and strategies. 

This doesn't mean they'll become enemies. They'll collaborate on some issues, compete on others, and even find themselves on opposing sides on others. It's a much more complex region than before. 

Whether we look at the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain, the general conclusion drawn from the experience of this war is that we must remain close to the countries that provided concrete assistance in times of need. And these are, above all, the United States and Israel. 

If we look at Saudi Arabia, however, we find strong concerns about the unpredictability and unreliability of the United States. The Saudis are under attack from Iran to the east, its allies in Iraq to the north, and the Houthis in Yemen to the south. The attacks have at times even led to the closure of Riyadh's airport. Saudi Arabia is engaged in an indirect, and sometimes direct, confrontation with the Houthis. 

This is why Riyadh has decided not to put all its eggs in the American basket and to seek other partners as well. This is the reason for the Mecca defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, the contacts with Syria regarding a possible military contribution, and the dialogue with Egypt. 

Qatar has chosen a different path. After a period of strategic confusion following the war, it has decided to revitalize and strengthen its role as an international mediator. 

At the other end of the spectrum is Oman, which has chosen to acknowledge Iranian power and seek an agreement with Tehran. It is the country most willing to negotiate agreements that could effectively introduce tolls for passage through what has until now been considered an international strait. 

If we look at the Carter Doctrine and the subsequent positions of the Reagan administration, we see that this perspective contradicts fundamental principles of American policy in the region for decades. Yet Oman and Iran are working in this direction. 

You are in Italy to participate in the MED Dialogues in Naples. In your meetings in the Middle East, are Italy and Europe still considered important interlocutors, or are they now marginalized in strategic decisions on the region?
 

Italy and the rest of Europe are certainly part of the conversation, but it must be acknowledged that they are less involved than they would like. The fundamental reason is not a lack of good leaders or ideas, but the fact that since the 1990s, Europeans have significantly reduced their ability to project military power. 

Ultimately, there is little diplomatic power without military power. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe has begun to reverse this trend. This is a positive development, but it will take many years to address the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, not to mention those in Europe's neighborhood across the Mediterranean. 

That said, there are many things we would like to see Europeans do. 

The first is to be very clear about who is the destabilizing actor in the region. Iran is a malign actor. One may or may not agree with Trump's decision to go to war. I've already said that I consider what happened in February the result of enormous mistakes. But this doesn't change my assessment of the destabilizing activities Iran has been conducting in the region since the 1979 revolution. Europe must be very clear on this point. 

The second issue concerns military supplies. Arms-exporting countries like Italy can facilitate and accelerate the sale of weapons systems to the Gulf states. All, despite their differences, are seeking to strengthen national military capabilities. 

The United States likely remains their preferred partner, but we cannot meet all their needs. Italy and the rest of Europe will have to help meet this demand. 

Finally, there's the economic role. How can alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz be built? How can new infrastructure be built to transport goods overland? 

There's the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and there are other projects connecting the region. For now, they're mostly on paper. They need to become reality. 

And since Europe would be among the main beneficiaries, it should be at the forefront of promoting and, above all, financing them. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, can afford to pay for their own infrastructure. Others, like Jordan and Syria, will have much more difficulty. This is precisely where Europe can make a difference. 

international/foreign

webinfo@adnkronos.com (Web Info)

Continue on the app The news of your city, in real time.
Open in app App Store